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doi:10.1016/j.euras.2010.10.003Those who study the development of linguistic theories
and related intellectual trends do not usually like to see
intellectual trends as being directly shaped by societal
changes or, even more so, by the direct intervention of raw
power. As a matter of fact, it is believed that it is ideology
that shapes the political and social reality.
The belief in the absolute power of “discourse” over
pliable social/political matter (in this interpretation,
discourse permeates and shapes the social/political reality
in a sort of neo-Platonic way) is shared not just by the aging
post-modernist left, but even by the rightdindeed, by quite
a few “neocons,” who believe that ideology is of the fore-
most importance. According to the USA neocon strategists,
it requires little eloquence to convince people that the
American capitalist democracy is the best among the
possible options. The military, of course, should also
provide essential help by removing tyrants who prevent
people from being fully cognizant of their inalienable
rights. Thus, the war against “Islamofascism” is to be
primarily fought on the “ﬁelds of discourse.” Still, a detailed
analysis of the ideological trends could easily reveal that
not only has ideological construction emerged from thePaciﬁc Research Center, Hanyapolitical realities but also that raw powerdespecially in
totalitarian statesdshapes the course even of the majority
of theoretical discussions, such as those that deal with
linguistic or historical phenomena of the distant past. The
case of Nikolai Marr, the leading Soviet linguist in the early
Soviet era, and the legacy of his theories could be a good
example.
1. Marr’s pre-revolutionary career and germination of
his linguistic theory
Nikolai Marr had an idiosyncratic background. He was
born of a Georgian mother and a Scottish father, who was
much older than his wife (Golubeva, 2002, pp. 9–10). His
early career hardly augured well for his future as a great
linguist. In fact, he barely wrote Russian, the language of
the empire (p. 13). Still, he was able not to just ﬁnish high
school but to become a student of St. Petersburg University,
which, by some accounts, was one of the world centers for
the study of the Orient in the late 19th century (p. 21). In
1888, Marr graduated and became engaged in the study of
Armenian culture and history (p. 23), and by 1900 he had
become a professor in the same university, where he taught
for 40 years (p. 25). Long before the Bolshevik Revolution,
Nikolai Marr made his name as a specialist in Caucasian
history and culture, especially those of Armenia. At the
same time, while specializing in these narrow studies, Marr
had great ambitions to be the creator of a linguistic theory
that could explain the origin and evolution of world
languages in a new way.ng University. Produced and distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.
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haustible energy1 and boundless ambition; and, in the
future, he would accept without any reservations the
accolades of those who compared him to Copernicus,
Darwin and similar luminaries (Golubeva, 2002, pp. 70). He
wanted to change linguistics completely, and he seems to
have pondered about a new theory even before the
Bolshevik Revolution (Meshchaninov, 2001). Indeed,
already as a student, he had discovered that the traditional
linguistic theory that divided languages into different
linguistic groups did not work; and by 1886 he had noted
the similarities between the Georgian and Semitic
languages (Mikhankova, 1949, pp. 16, 27; Thomas, 1957,
pp. 2). In 1899, he had also proclaimed that the Armenian
language is the result of “Indo-European and Japhetic
integration (Alpatov, 1991, p. 18).” By the beginning of the
20th century, he also had discovered that the languages of
major linguistic groups, e.g., Indo-European languages, are
not the most ancient but are preceded by other languages;
in fact, these languages could be seen as a synthetic
arrangement where several languages had been integrated
with each other. The Armenian language in this arrange-
ment, for example, was a product of both Indo-European
languages and the more ancient language that preceded
them (Mikhankova, 1949, pp. 173). It seems that Marr also
had formed his Japhetic theory by that time (L’Hermitte,
1987, pp. 13) and was convinced that the scholarly
community should accept his discoveries. He also appar-
ently believed that the scholarly community did not accept
his ﬁndings because of bureaucratic routine; and pro-
claimed that scholars were jealous because of fear that new
ﬁndings would undermine their prestige and position.
With his boundless enthusiasm, Marr hardly minded using
force if necessary to drive his ideas through bureaucratic
obstacles. The Bolshevik Revolution and the rise of the
Soviet regime had provided him with the means to
accomplish his plans. And, in fact, his energy and ambition
made him a good example of scholars in that turbulent era
(Freidenberg).
2. Linguistics of worldwide revolution
While analyzing Marr’s theories one should remember
that they were quite contradictory in their nature. “Marr’s
theories are chieﬂy notable for the fact that they merge,
overlay one another, and in their historical development,
undergo an almost endless number of modiﬁcations and
permutations. This characteristic of his constructs brought
in its train another: his theories are full of contradictions,
lapses, and exaggerations (Thomas, 1957, pp. 135).” Still, his
theories have a deﬁnite core: the rejection of the attach-
ment of a particular language to a particular racial/ethnic
group and emphasis on the mutual synchronic nature of1 One could assume that Marr would actually work himself to death.
See Golubeva, 2002, p. 22, 64–65. This assumption, indeed, does not look
as being absolutely incredible if one would remember that Marr’s death
was directly related with one of his professional trips. “In 1933, on one of
his countless trips, he fell ill of the grippe and, a few months later, had
a slight stroke. He never fully recovered. During the night of December
19, 1934, he died of arteriosclerosis. (Thomas, 1957, p. 88).the languages of various groups and their plasticity that
actually made it possible to create one language for all of
humanity. And this is what made Marr’s theories quite
appealing to Russia and the USSR’s new rulers, at least in
the very beginning of the Soviet regime’s existence.
To start with, upon ascending to power, the Bolsheviks
had discarded most of the institutions and theories
inherited from pre-revolutionary Russia. They discarded, at
least in the very beginning of their rule, the previous
theories as being “bourgeois” and unacceptable to a new
society of workers and peasants. The Bolsheviks also
believed that Soviet Russia was not just the ﬁrst country of
workers and peasants but was also a springboard for
worldwide revolution, which, in the future, would create
a worldwide republic of workers and peasants. In this
respect, the Bolsheviks followed the Marxist doctrine of
“Proletariat of all countries unite!” and was strongly
against nationalism, which, in their view, disunited the
workers. This stress on international globalism also stem-
med from the Bolsheviks’ view of the Russian empire, the
Russia of the tsar, as the “prison of the nations.”Many, if not
all, of the Soviet regime premises were appealing to Marr,
who accentuated this internationalistic aspect of his theo-
ries, believing this would make them more appealing to
new rulers and would help him to be a leader of emerging
Soviet linguistics.
Having a good sense of the prevailing political climate in
the USSR, Marr proclaimed that all linguistic theories that
had existed and were approved by the global scholarly
community should be discarded. And, consequently, it was
only the new Soviet scholarsdand Marr, of course,
included himself among these scholarsdwho should
create a new Soviet linguistic. This linguistic should be the
science of the future. Marr also had a good sense of what
the Soviet leaders wanted from him as well as from other
scholars who took the Bolsheviks’ side, especially those
who were in the social sciences and humanities. Indeed,
Marr had never tried to hide the fact that his theories were
directly connected with the demands of the regime. Marr
made this clear in one of his public speeches. He stated that
he is fully aware of the political needs of the regime and
regarded himself as the regime’s soldier ﬁrst of all. “I
realized the ﬁction of apoliticalness and, naturally, dis-
carded it. At the present moment of aggravated class
struggle, I ﬁrmly stand at my post (that of a ﬁghter on the
cultural-scientiﬁc front) for a clear general line in prole-
tarian scientiﬁc theory, and for the general line of the
Communist party (Thomas, 1957, pp. 88).” And he stated
that he put himself on the side of the regime from the very
beginning of the regime’s existence. “From the ﬁrst days of
October, I stood, to the best of my abilities, shoulder to
shoulder with Communist comrades and, together with
other nonparty people of similar stamp, assisted in the
work of a revolutionary cultural-scientiﬁc construction of
incomparable scope. (pp. 88)”. His linguistic theories
were also directly connected with the needs of the state: “I
tried and am trying to develop a theoretical science of
languagedthe region inwhich I carry onmy scientiﬁc work
(pp. 88).” The state seems to have reciprocated. He was
hailed on all sides as the greatest Soviet linguist. In 1928, on
the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of his scholarly
2 Quoted in Thomas (1957), p. 53.
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for his published work. And his “career became a triumphal
procession (pp. 88).”
Five years later, he received the highest reward of the
state. “In 1933, on the forty-ﬁfth anniversary of his schol-
arly work, the Soviet government bestowed on him the
Order of Lenin, and the Central Executive Committee of the
U.S.S.R. decreed that the Institute of Language and Thought
was to bear his name.” Marr’s life, however, was drawing to
a close (pp. 88). Still, even his death did not stop the ﬂow of
state awards and honors. Indeed, “literally scores of post-
humous honors were bestowed upon him; the most
important of these was the naming of the State Academy of
History of Material Culture after him (pp. 88).” This high
appreciation of Marr’s work was, of course, due to the fact
that his linguistic theories ﬁt well the political designs of
the regime.
The Soviet leaders had emphasized that “world revo-
lution”was at hand; at least, this was so in the beginning of
the 1920s. Later, the Bolsheviks proclaimed that the capi-
talist world had entered a period of “temporary stabiliza-
tion.” Still, the notion of “world revolution” had not
completely disappeared from ofﬁcial discourse, possibly
not until the beginning of WWII. Nationalism, which
emphasized proletariat unity with the bourgeois, was
absolute anathema until the late 1920s/early 1930s, at least
in ofﬁcial statements. Marr had translated this ideological
doctrine in his linguistic theories. He stated clearly that the
theory that sees language divided into several linguistic
trees was absolutely unacceptable, for it implied that lan-
guagedand, therefore, the peopledhad been divided along
linguistic and ethnic lines already in the beginning of
human history and, therefore, their future divisions were
predestined. Marr had resolutely rejected this assumption
(Thomas, 1957, pp. 59). His goal was to emphasize the
sameness of the people, or, to be precise, the sameness of
the toilers, which, in the future, would help unify them for
future worldwide revolution and unity in a society of
toilers. For this reason, Marr started his analysis with
prehistory, the timewhen human beings had only begun to
develop their linguistic capacity. At that time, humans,
regardless of their groups, later, tribes, or, to be precise,
semi-tribal afﬁliations, spoke a very simple language/
dialect, on the basis of four simple sounds (Chikobava,
1951–1952; Golubev, 2002, pp. 61).
The primitive simplicity of these early proto-languages
implied that they could be easily melded into one language;
one could assume that all humanitydand at that time, it
existed in conditions of “primitive communism,” according
to Marxist dictumdspoke one language, if not in actuality
at least in potentiality. And, of course, social and political
universalism was the harbinger of the future unity of
socialist humanity. Elaborating on this notion, Marr wrote,
“According to Japhetic linguistics, the birth, growth and
future or eventual achievement of human speech can be
depicted in the form of a pyramid standing on its base.
From awide base, a proto-linguistic state is passed through
a series of typological transformations, aspiring to the
summit, that is, to the linguistic unity of the whole world.
The paleontology of Indo-European linguistics, with its
single proto-language, is reducible to a pyramid placed onits summit with the base upward (Thomas, 1957, pp. 281).”
One could assume, as Marr implied, that all people in the
dawn of human history spoke a multiple “dialect” of one
language. This linguistic sameness of the prehistoric peo-
pledwho lived, according to Marxist doctrine, in the
condition of “primitive communism”dindicated the future
unity of the global proletariat after the future worldwide
revolution. Later, these primitive “dialects,” proto-
languages, or at least most of them, had coalesced in what
Marr called the Japhetic language, which was the virtual
lingua franca for the majority of the people in Eurasia. Thus,
in this interpretation of the origin of languages, they were
not connected with certain linguists and, implicitly, ethnic
families but with certain stages in social/economic devel-
opment (Golubev, 2002, pp. 61). This linguistic univer-
salism in the early historical era also indicated the future
unity of the humanity of the worldwide socialist society.
The universalist aspect of Marr’s theory was also
emphasized by his fondness for the theory of the integra-
tion of languages. It was through this symbiosis of language
that a new language emerged. As a matter of fact, Marr
emphasized the notion that one could not ﬁnd languages
that did not experience the inﬂuence of other languages
(Mikhankova, 1949, pp. 407). The new languages did not
eliminate the previous languages; they continued to exist
in the new languages but in different forms (Gukhman, pp.
319). This linguistic, and, implicitly, societal, unity of
humanitydof course, mostly toilersdhad been preserved,
at least in its latent form, until the present day. And, for this
reason, Marr had found similarities in languages that
traditional linguists would never ﬁnd.
Moving from pre-historical and early historical periods
to the historical period, Marr could not ignore the linguistic
groups and clear differences in languages. Still, even here,
Marr was unwilling to accept the notion that people of
a particular nation had spoken the same language regard-
less of social division, e.g., toilers and the elite had the same
language, So, in one of the interpretations of the origin
of Indo-European languages, he made Indo-European
languages the product of social and economic changes
(Serebrennikov)dthe Indo-European languages might be
called a language of the conquerors, the language of the
ruling elite (pp. 54), who also were inﬂuenced by the
original Japhetic family. Elaborating on this, Marr wrote:
“Over the entire land known to the cultural world of that
timedfrom the Caucasus and Asia Minor to the Iberian
Peninsuladthere was one language, the language of the
Japhetic family. They and the Semites were disunited
although not yet separated. A blow at the unity of the
Japhetic world, perhaps, may have been delivered even
earlier; but the last ‘annihilating’ blowdthe coup de
grâcedwas the Indo-European invasion, with the resulting
mixture accompanied by a process of hybridization, the
birth of new, mixed linguistic types and the drying up of
mutual comprehension.”2 This was related with Marr’s
general premises, which often related this or that language
with a particular social group/class (Sukhotin). In fact, in
some cases, Marr asserted that each nation has two
3 “Khronika nauchnoi lingvisticheskoi zhizni,” Sumerki Lingvistiki,
pp. 173–176.
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other the language of the toilers (pp. 16). Relating linguistic
dominationwith social/economic and political domination,
Marr here stated that the future elite had taken over the
people of the Japhetic languagedwho, in this reading
became a type of toilers. The elite in this case imposed not
just their power over the originally Japhetic-speaking
masses but also their ideology and even the domination of
the elite’s languages. It was essential, as Marr implied, to
ensure the elite’s domination over the masses. Here, of
course, Marr had followed the Marxist dictum that implied
that the elite, e.g., the bourgeois, could maintain its power
over the proletariat in many ways because the bourgeois
was able to brainwash the proletariat and impose upon it
the bourgeois ideology; and this was one of the essential, if
not the most important, dictums of Marxism. Indeed, it is
assumed by Marxists that Marxism’s major goal was to
liberate workers from the domination of the bourgeois
ideology and acquire the ideology that would be the most
adequate to proletariat needs.
3. Marr and “turn to the East”
Blurring the differences between the languages was one
of the major ideological postulates that made Marr’s
approach to languages a linguistic backdrop, so to speak, of
worldwide revolution. There was also another aspect of
Marr’s theory that ﬁt well the political design of the Soviet
regime in the very beginning of its existence. While
believing in following Marx, of course, that a revolution in
Russia would spark a revolution in Europe, the place of an
advanced and numerous proletariat, the Soviet rulers soon
discovered that launching a European-wide victorious
revolution would not be as easy as they believed. Later,
when the dreams of worldwide revolution in the West had
subsided even more, the Soviet leaders increasingly turned
to the East in search of allies. Indeed, here the Bolsheviks’
call for revolution had found much more receptive ears,
due, of course, to the very simple fact that anti-capitalist
propaganda was seen simply as anti-Western. Moreover,
this anti-Westernism had also racial overtones for the
colonial powers of Europe were also the powers of the
white man. Marr had a very good sense of the regime’s
needs and responded to these political demands already in
1918/19, he pointed out that the study of the “archaic world
of Asia, Africa and Europe” should be the essential task of
Soviet scholars (Mikhankova, 1949, pp. 286).
Sensing the importance of the East, Marr later reem-
phasized the importance of studying Asian cultures and
languages and hailed the Orient as a “huge and rising
power of future humanity.” Following the Soviet leaders, he
implicitly transformed not the European proletariat but all
the suppressed people of the East as a vanguard, together
with the people of the USSR, of the future revolution of the
liberation of humanity (Mikhankova, 1949, pp. 377). The
importance of non-European people in the present and the
future and the general anti-colonialist drive of Soviet
foreign policy, which, of course, would increase in the post-
WWII era, also led Marr to engage in the study of the
African language (pp. 398). This anti-colonialist and,
implicitly, anti-European drive was also integrated intorespect for minorities whatever they were. Marr, for
example, blasted the French for paying too much attention
to the Roman Empire and the Latin language and ignoring
the contributions of the indigenous people of Europe
(pp. 401).
Marr’s theory, with its universalistic appeal, ﬁt well in
the political designs of the Soviet elite the support of the
minorities, and the increasing “turn to the East” where the
revolutionary geopoliticians of the regime looked for the
replacement of the European proletariat as themajor ally of
the regime. It was clear to observers that Marr had received
an ofﬁcial blessing and that those who would follow after
him would have a much better chance of promoting their
careers than others. It was not accidental that Marr quickly
acquired numerous followers. Like their teacher and boss,
they proclaimed that “all languages of the world have
a genetic connection (Lomtev)” and there would be
a uniﬁed language in the future, at a time when socialism
would be victorious all over the globe (Grande). And they
proclaimed, those linguists who attached a particular
language to a particular ethnic/racial group were nothing
but reactionary servants of the bourgeoisie (pp. 104). While
the triumph of one language was inevitable, Soviet scholars
were to be prepared for the future. And, in fact, the Soviet
scholars had already taken a step in this direction and
started to create the same alphabet for all the people of
Soviet Union (pp. 106). The anticipation of a future uniﬁed
language also led to the popularity of Esperanto.3
While association with Marr’s enemies could bring
nothing but trouble, afﬁliation with “Marrism” was
a different story. One, of course, could not guarantee that an
afﬁliationwith Marr would be trouble-free. The intellectual
and political climate had changed rapidly; and, in any case,
one could not be sure that Marr was still seen by the
authorities as the paragon of Soviet science, association
with whom could lead to a good career and security. One, of
course, could add that those young and ambitious Soviet
scholars, many of them rising from the lower classes to
pursue an academic career, were not entirely unique in
their behavior. And the environment in which they worked
was also not entirely unique. Those who worked in the
West knew well that those who followed fashionable
theories and subjects and those who accepted the domi-
nant interpretations of these subjects had a much better
chance of promoting their careers than those who did not
follow the rules. Still, one might not compare life in
Western academia with that of life in the Stalinist USSR.
With all the problems that the ostracized “ugly ducklings”
could face in the West, they would still not be concerned
with personal security. And this was, indeed, the case with
the Stalinist USSR where professional ostracism led not just
to the inability to publish and loss of job but, increasingly,
to exile and, as state repression grew, to a Gulag. Marr’s
invectives against his enemies inadvertently helped the
regime to eliminate those whom the regime regarded as
troublemakers.
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Marr implicitly regarded himself as somewhat of
a Marxian linguist. He regarded it his duty as a Soviet sci-
entistdand, of course, as a good way to promote his
careerdto destroy the old traditional linguistics that
emphasized the historical separation of the people along
linguistic/ethnic lines. He emphasized that language
development is clearly connected with social-economic
and political development, and, implicitly, with particular
social strata. The theory thus ﬁt will with Marxist inter-
nationalism of the early Soviet regime and the dream of
worldwide revolution. Institutionalized as Marxism incar-
nated in linguistics, Marr’s theories received the full
support of the state, which, implicitly saw those who did
not agree with Marr as committing, not just scholarly but,
implicitly, political errors, which would lead to appropriate
and increasingly harsh punishment by the state. Marr
hardly discouraged the state from using repression against
those who did not agree with his theories. Moreover, he
actually helped the state. The reason why Marr had
encouraged the terrorist drive of the regime against those
who disagreed with his theories was manifold. On one
hand, the call for being harsh with those who did not ﬁt the
system and who could be suspected of being the enemy of
the regime was the spirit of the times. Leniency could be
seen as a sign of compliance with the enemies of the
regime. Indeed, those who did not attack the alleged
enemies with appropriate vigor could well themselves be
seen as the enemy and end badly. Marr understood this
well. He understood that he could well end in the sameway
as those whom he failed to accuse with appropriate vigor.
Marr was pretty much aware that, despite heaps of praise
from the regime, he could end his life badly and be thrown
from the scientiﬁc and quasi-political Olympus to a camp or
a cell as a man condemned to death. Marr saw this as
everybody else saw this happen with leading ﬁgures in the
Soviet hierarchy, such as Trotsky, who overnight was
transformed from the right hand of Lenin and the apple of
the eye of the Soviet regime into a disgusting enemy of the
people with his followers thrown in camps already in the
1920s. Marr alsomost likely felt that despite the fact that he
was still praised as the greatest linguist, his theories were
increasingly out of step with the spirit of the times.
The theory of those who discarded nationalism and
actually mocked it had been ofﬁcially banned since 1932
when the authorities openly condemned the theory of
M. N. Pokrovskydthe leading Soviet historian of the early
years of the Soviet regime. And it was Pokrovsky who fully
supported Marr. Moreover, the ideological and political
loyalty to “big brother” was not at all a guarantee of one’s
career or even physical survival, especially in the 1930s
when the regime started to strike out randomly against
even its most dedicated stalwarts. One could state that
Marr himself was not sure that he would be spared by the
regime; already in the 1930s, during the peak of his inﬂu-
ence, he still dreaded arrest (Golubeva, 2002, p. 73).
Marr’s fear for his own life was one of the major,
possibly subconscious, reasons why he tried to demon-
strate his, implicit, call for tough punishment for those who
disagreed with him. Besides this reason, there was possiblyanother one. Despite his formidable position in the schol-
arly community and quite a few followers who supposedly
were fascinated with Marr’s theories, he felt that he had no
real supporters, that those who clung to him did this just
for career considerations. He felt that he was actually iso-
lated. Indeed, even at the height of his power and inﬂuence,
by the end of his life, Marr complained that he was actually
completely isolated. It goes without saying, he complained,
that Western scholars had slandered both his name and his
theories. He implied here that they were against him for
various reasons. One was that he was quite dedicated to
scholarship and fully engaged “in the most sacred” for him
scholarly research (Mikhankova, 1949, pp. 421). He implied
that Western scholars in the majority are not real scientists
who dedicated their life to the sacred task of advancing
human knowledge, but petty careerists; and for them
Marr’s true dedication to science looks strange and irrita-
tingdand this was the reason they disliked him. Secondly,
as he implied, they hated him because of his great scientiﬁc
discoveries; because they demonstrated how worthless
was the research of these Western scholars; and for this
reason, he asserted, they would slander him and his theo-
ries even after his death (Mikhankova, 1949, pp. 421). The
problem, however, existed not just in the West. Indeed,
Marr complained that he had enemies not only in the West
but he actually did “not know the place where there is no
negative feeling about me (pp. 361).” And here, he implied,
that he was hated even in the USSR, regardless of all
external signs of respect and love. By the end of his life, in
1930, Marr complained he still did not “have not even one
true follower” among specialist linguists (Marr). Marr’s
most trusted lieutenants also complained that even those
who supposedly fully subscribed toMarr’s theories actually
were not true followers. This feeling of isolation or even of
despise by others infuriated Marr even more, and he called
on the authorities to strike against his enemies. Marr, for
example, directly accused Indo-Europeanists as being the
people who justiﬁed the suppression of the colonial people
by European imperialists (Alpatov, 1991, pp. 63). Such
accusations could well lead not just to the loss of a job but
also to a transfer to a Gulag.
The grave implications of Marr’s invectives against his
opponents became increasingly clear by the late 1920s and,
of course, through the 1930s, where the intensity of
repressions had risen dramatically. The connection
between the critics of Marr’s theories and anti-regime
ideological stands seems to have lost any logic by the 1930s.
By 1933, Marr was gravely ill and would die by 1934.
Moreover, this was a time when the increasing stress on
Russian nationalism started to undo the universalistic
internationalism of his theories. Still, by that time, Marr’s
accusations against those who disagreed with him became
quite handy for the state to strike against the groups of
scholars who could be seen as a potential threat for the
regime.
As was noted, Marr’s emphasis was on the universalist
aspect of the languages and disconnection between
languages and particular ethnic groups. This could hardly
be accepted by any serious Slavists who saw the Slavic
language as a part of the Indo-European linguistic tree
related to particular ethnic groups. They also related the
4 Their correspondence is preserved in Vernadsky Collection in the
Bakhmet’ev Archives in Columbia University.
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deﬁnitely saw these people as being serious ideological
and, implicitly, political, enemies. And the state deﬁnitely
took Marr’s implicit recommendation to deal harshly with
these people close to heart when it opened the “case of
Slavists” (delo Slavistov) in 1933/1934, which had led to the
arrests of quite a few leading Russian Slavists; many of
them had been physically eliminated (Gorbanevsky, 1991,
pp. 87–88).
5. From Marr’s universalism to Russian nationalism:
Eurasianists as the missing link
Marr’s theory of the intrinsic interconnection of the
languages was related to the regime’s belief in the coming
of worldwide revolution, which would transform backward
Russia, at least from theMarxist perspective, into the leader
of the world community. These dreams were not entirely
ﬁction. In the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution, the revo-
lutionary movement had errupted in many countries in
Europe and was especially strong in Germany. The social
upheaval was well supported by the Red Army, which
plunged deeply into Poland with the goal of a rich
Germany. Leon Trotsky, commander-in-chief, had been
inspired by a mixture of a new peculiar form of nationalism
and revolutionary élan. His war effort in ﬁghting Poland
had received the full blessing of some ofﬁcers of the
Russian imperial army, who saw in the war the transition
from early internationalism to primordial healthy Russian
nationalism.
The merger of nationalism and socialist ideology led to
what is called “National Bolshevism.” By the 1920s, the
dreams of worldwide revolution started to be removed
from the realm of practical politics and became increasingly
an abstract shibboleth, rather like the assumption among
the Christian ideologists that all Christians, in fact, all
humans, are brothers and sisters, albeit in both cases this
assumption had and has little if any practical implications
for the majority. While the dream of a worldwide prole-
tariat started to subside, the emphasis was put increasingly
on the unity of the people of the USSR. As a matter of fact,
the Soviet ideologists started to emphasize that Soviet
people were united not only because of the same social
backgrounddafter 1929, the regime ideologists proclaimed
that the people of the USSR had purged “exploitive” classes
(landlords and capitalists) from their midstdnot only
because of their common goals, building a socialist, and
later communist, society, but because of their common
historical roots that could be traced to almost the prehis-
toric past. “Eurasianists”da group of émigrésdhad elabo-
rated on this theory and promulgated that the people of
Russia/Eurasia had historically constituted an organic unity.
Their culture and languages were also interrelated; and it
was this common space and historical destiny, not the
formal linguistic roots, that were the more important. In
the context of this theory, elaborated on, for example,
by such Eurasian-minded linguists as Prince Trubetskoy
and Roman Jacobson, Russian was closer to the Turkic
languages of Russia/Eurasia than to the languages of
Western Slavs, plainly because Western Slavs lived outside
Eurasian space. The relationship between Eurasianistlinguists and Marr was complicated. Some ﬂatly discarded
Marr’s theories and even contemptuously compared Marr’s
writings with those of a person from a madhouse
(Golubeva, 2002, pp. 69). Besides a scholarly disagreement,
one should remember the political and personal disagree-
ment, so to speak. Still, a close look indicates that there was
much similarity between Eurasianist linguisticsdand Eura-
sianism as a creed in generaldand Marr’s theories.
The Eurasianists’ relationship to Marr was deeply con-
nected with the Eurasianist views on the Soviet regime.
And, here, one could see that the relationship of Eura-
sianists to the Soviet regimewas not totally antagonistic. To
start with, Left Eurasianistsdthose who split from the
mainstreamdhad a strong drive toward the Soviet regime,
quite a few of them plainly identiﬁed themselves with the
regime and assumed that this regime actually had a global
mission to save humanity not just from social problems but
even from what could be called its metaphysical ills. For
example, the Left Eurasianists believed that the Soviet
leaders had followed the pathway of Nikolai Fedorov, the
extravagant savant of pre-revolutionary Russia who
assumed that Russia’s goal is to lead humanity to complete
victory over nature, spreading humanity over the cosmos
and even the resurrection of the dead.
Mainstream Eurasianists, including leading Eurasianist
linguists such as Trubetskoy, also expressed a positive
feeling toward the regime, mostly because of the increasing
integration of cultures of the people of Russia/Eurasia
and the developing cultures of the ethnic minorities of
Russia/Eurasia. Still, conservative Eurasianists distanced
themselves from the regime and often looked at it with
hostility. Besides ideological problems with the regime,
they had a personal reason. Their colleagues and relatives
who remained in the USSR suffered, and their own position
in emigration was often precarious, whereas those who
were incorporated in the Soviet establishment enjoyed
perks, the good life, and stability; at least, those in
emigration often perceived this to be the case, especially
before the wave of terror in the 1930s. For quite a few of
these people, Marr was a good example of an unprincipled
scholar, who actually sold himself to new masters for
personal comfort and power. Moreover, Marr was seen as
a person whose accusation against those who disagreed
with him led to the direct intervention of the authorities;
or, at least, the authorities had taken Marr’s accusations as
a good excuse for repression. All of this could hardly help
Marr to emerge as a positive ﬁgure in the eyes of many
Eurasianists who knew him and/or his work. Still, Marr was
not completely ostracized. For example, he engaged in
correspondence with a leading Eurasianist historian–
George Vernadsky, the son of the Soviet Academician Vla-
dimir Vernadsky who, together with Edouard Le Roy, was
the inventor of the term “noosphere,” the sphere of human
thought and activities with cosmic dimension, and
a teacher and researcher at Yale University.4 The very fact
that Vernadsky was engaged in correspondence with Marr
indicated that Eurasianism and Marr’s theories had a lot in
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between language/culture and particular ethnic groups and
saw the connections between languages/cultures that were
seen as being completely different from each other by the
majority of their colleagues. In a way, their linguistic/
cultural construction was arbitrary; they were post-
modernistic arbitrary. They were actually creators of
“imagined communities,” if one would use Benedict
Anderson’s famous term. The major difference seen
between Marr’s theories and those of Eurasianists was
geographic limits. For Marr, all the world languages were
actually interdependent and related, whereas for Eura-
sianists everything was related to the space of Russia/Eur-
asia. While Eurasianists, especially in their early reasoning,
regarded all the people of Russia/Eurasia and their culture/
language as being equally important, as time progressed,
they increasingly saw Russians as the key element of Eur-
asia/Russia. The Russian culture and language became
pivotal. It is true that Eurasian people do constitute
a brotherly family of languages/culture; still, in this family
it was the Russians who played the role of benign “older
brothers” in linguistic/cultural and, implicitly, political
arrangements. And it was Eurasianismddespite its position
of émigré teachingdthat provided the connection between
Marr’s linguistic/cultural universalismdlinguist backdrop
for the theory of world revolutiondto the ideology of
Russian nationalism, in its peculiar, idiosyncratic, arrange-
ment that became the leading creed in the late Stalin USSR.
Here, Marr’s theories were hardly acceptable and was dis-
carded by the regime.
6. The rise of Russian nationalism and the increasing
role of ethnic Russians as “older brothers”
The notion of the Soviet people as a mosaic of various
ethnic groups bound together not just by the common,
present-day social positions, the striving to build socialism
and, later, communism, but also because of their common
historical roots continuedtobeanessential elementof Soviet
ideology in the post-WWII era. Still, Russian nationalism
started to be increasingly pronounced; and ethnic Russians
increasingly played the role of “older” and, therefore, major
“brothers” in the Soviet family. The great importance of the
state, in late Stalinist Russia/USSR demanded the emphasis
on unity of all ethnic Russians, regardless of social position.
And, here, the cosmopolitan internationalism of Marr’s
theories were one of the victims of the new trends.
This process of ideological transformation had started in
the late 1920s/early 1930s and reached its peak during the
WWII and, especially, post-WWII periods. The Bolshevik
Revolution in this reading was important not because it
started the transformation of the global community into
a socialistic society of the future but because it had forged
the mighty Russian state. In fact, in this interpretation,
history is seen not as the transition from capitalism to
socialism, as was suggested by Marxism and early
Leninism, but as the progressive aggrandizement of the
Russian state, endowed with a messianic mission. This
interpretation of history necessitates the end of the early
internationalist views, with rather negative views on the
Russian state. These views could be found in the works ofMikhail Pokrovsky, who fully supported Marr, and whose
views, implicitly, regarded as being quite similar to his own
(Thomas, 1957, pp. 92). Besides the attack of the Pokrovsky
school of interpretation of history, especially Russian
history, these changes of ideological paradigms manifested
themselves in many other ways. Indeed, the increasing
importance of the Russian state and ethnic Russians led to
an interest in everything Slavic.
The study of Slavic civilizationwas hardly encouraged in
the early period of Soviet history as a subject closely con-
nected with Russian nationalism and nationalism in
general; all of this was anathema in early Soviet ideology.
Marr, following the general ideological trend, could hardly
appreciate the study of Slavic languages and cultures,
which implied, at least in the context of traditional
Slavic studies, that the Slavonic languages were a branch of
Indo-European languages that themselves were tightly
connected with particular ethnic groups but not with
a particular stage of development or some mystical
conqueror who mastered the original Japhetic folk. And it
was not surprising that Russian Slavists were decimated by
authorities and possibly not without Marr’s encourage-
ment. Still, the situation started to change by the 1930s as
war increasingly loomed on the horizon, with Germany as
one of the most likely foes. The increasingly nationalistic
patriotism changed the very nature of the visualization of
the USSR’s future war. It became distinctly different from
what one could ﬁnd in Soviet ideology in the 1920s. The
increasing international tensions and corresponding
increasing stress on Russian nationalism framed a possible
confrontation with the Germans not as a struggle between
the capitalist West and socialist Russia/USSR but as
a primordial struggle between Slavs, Russians ﬁrst of all,
and Germans. This could be easily seen in Sergei Eisen-
stein’s Alexander Nevsky, which dealt with the Russian ﬁght
against the Teutonic knights in the 13th century. The
interest in Slavic civilizations was revived. During WWII,
Slavophilism provided additional ideological justiﬁcation
for Soviet war efforts, which, in this case, were placed in the
context of the centuries-old struggle between the Slavs and
Germany. Therefore, it was not surprising that in 1943
a Department of Slavic Studies was opened in Moscow
State University (Alpatov,1991, pp.131). By the end ofWWII
and the emergence of the Soviet/Russian East European
empire, the importance of Slavic civilization was fully
legitimized. One of the manifestations of these processes
was the ofﬁcial renewed interest in a modiﬁed form of
Slavophilism that emphasized the leading role of ethnic
Russians in the Slavic family. The theory did not just justify
the close ties between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians and
Belorussiansdwho constitute the central Slavic core of the
USSRdbut also provided justiﬁcation for the emerging East
European, mostly Slavic, empire. The USSR, with its Slavic
core, was given, at least in the context of this theory, a role
as the natural protector/patron of the Slavic people in
Europe, the role allotted by pre-revolutionary Slavophiles
to the Russian monarchy.
Marr’s theory emphasized the similarities of languages
and their clear connection with the social position of those
who spoke the languages. This theory had worked in the
beginning of Soviet history; at the same time, it had
5 This stress on historical legitimacy as being related to the assumption
that this or that people had lived in a particular region from centuries or
even millennia looks strange to people of the New World, e.g., Americans
and Canadians, most of whom, besides of course, Indians, are descen-
dants of émigrés who came to the place relatively recently. This notion,
however, is quite important in other parts of the globe, especially among
the members of what could be deﬁned as traditionalist society, or society
with a strong traditionalist streak in their political culture. For them, the
notion that their ancestors had lived on this land for centuries/millennia
is quite important for legitimacy.
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more so after WWII when Russian nationalism became an
integral part of Soviet ideology. And while Marxism-
Leninism continued to be the ofﬁcial ideology, Russian
nationalism had increasingly played the leading role in
ofﬁcial and public discourse. As a matter of fact, the real,
functional ideology of the regime could be deﬁned as
National-Bolshevism. The very nature of this ideology was
the assumption that the glory of the Bolshevik Revolution
and the Soviet regime was not so much the promotion of
worldwide revolution as the strengthening of the Russian
state. Russian nationalism implied the unity of all Rus-
siansdthe major ethnic group of the USSR. This unity was
arranged along ethnic lines, not so much along social lines;
and it also implied a stress on ethnic Russians’ common
origin and illustrious past.
Marr’s theories were actually ideological misﬁts, so to
speak, already by the 1930s; and his theories were not
entirely discarded because of what might be considered an
intellectual/ideological inertia, an obscurity of linguistic
and state interest in other intellectual realms. Marr himself
was dead; thus he could not create a problem. Finally, one
of the possible reasons was that Marr was Georgian, the
same ethnicity as Stalin; and accusations of being not
totally pro-Russian held against one Georgian could have
a negative association with Stalin at a time when he was
shaping his image as the great Russian patriot. All of the
complexity of the political-ideological trends in the late
Stalinist USSR explains why that by the late 1940s, when
the emphasis on Russian nationalism had reached its peak,
Marr’s teaching was still not ofﬁcially discarded; and he
continued to be regarded, ofﬁcially, as a great Soviet
linguist. Still, the new ideological element required a rein-
terpretation of Marr’s teaching.
Sensing the changes in the intellectual/political climate,
those who dealt with Marr’s intellectual heritage tried to
transform him into a good Russian patriot who understood
the importance of ethnic Russians for the development of
the Russian state. V. A. Mikhankova, the author of the
quoted work on Marr, engaged in this work with
enthusiasm.
As the experienced ideological cadredand otherwise
Mikhankova would not have been employed nor her work
publisheddshe understood the importance of the current
ideological trends. One of them was the discarding of the
dangerous “Norman theory,” whose supporters maintain
that Kievan Russia was built by Normans. This theory
downplayed the historical legitimacy of ethnic Russians as
the major ethnic group that built the Russian state and,
implicitly, reduced them to just one of the ethnic groups of
the state. The Eurasianists did the same; and their emphasis
on the role of other, non-Slavic, people of Eurasia in the
building of Russia was also out of order in the current
ideological climate. Fully understood, the new trend,
Mikhankova stated, that what Marr emphasized was that
Russians were an indigenous people of Russia and they
did not come from other places. The stress on the fact
that various peopledRussians/Slavs in generaldwere an
indigenous people was important in the neo-traditionalist
ideology of the late Stalin era, for it emphasized the legit-
imacy of Russians/Slavs as residents of what would be theRussian state in the future. At the same time, this stress on
Slavic/Russians actual over-presence in the territory of the
East European plain implicitly discarded the postulates of
Eurasianists and Eurasianist-sounding ideologists of the
early Soviet period, who emphasized that the Slavs were
just one among many of the people who lived in Northern
Eurasia.5 Rejecting this notion, Mikhankova stated that
Marr fully understood that it was Russians and other Slavic
people who were the builders of the Kievan state
(Mikhankova, 1949, pp. 295). The Slavic languages,
including the Russian language, had developed internally;
and the role of other languages in the formation of the
Russian language should not be overestimated (pp. 291–
294). As a matter of fact, Marr emphasized that the Russian
language should be the focus of Soviet researchers (pp.
293). In this presentation of Marr’s views, he was not just
a great Russian patriot but he actually despised the West. It
was not just Western scholars who were narrow-minded
ideologists of the bourgeois, but Western life itself was
actually primitive and poor. It was noted in this respect that
when Marr visited Germany, he found that the people lived
extremely poorly and did not even eat well (pp. 463). The
attempt to make Marr a good Russian patriot, and, conse-
quently, a praiseworthy ﬁgure, had been made before Sta-
lin’s criticism of Marr in this regard; and praise of Marr
would be immediately stopped when Stalin made it clear
what he thought about Marr.
Marr’s theories with their universal appeal were already
at odds with the general political-ideological trends in the
1930s. Even less did his theories ﬁt the ideological milieu of
the late 1940s-early 1950s. For various reasons, Marr’s
theories had not been a subject of the several major ideo-
logical campaigns of the late Stalinist era, when the state
rallied against the West not so much as a manifestation of
capitalism but plainly because the West was a foreign
civilization that had been hostile to Russia since the dawn
of Russian history. One might assume that Stalin was still
reluctant to attack his fellow Georgians for not being good
Russian patriots, for this could still cast an unfavorable
shade upon him. And it is this that made it possible for
some Soviet ideologists to transform Marr into a whole-
some Russian nationalist. Still, a few years before Stalin’s
death, he took a decisive step in unmasking Marr’s follies.
One possible explanation was that by the end of his life,
Stalin felt himself so much Russian and so much detached
from the Georgiansddespite his heavy accentdand so
much above ordinary mortals that he believed that the
critics of Marr would hardly tarnish his image in any way.
At the same time, Marr’s internationalism, mixed with
what could be called by Stalin as critics of a sort of vulgar
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architectonics of late Stalinism.
For this reason, Marr’s theories were resolutely dis-
carded by Stalin, who had blasted them, in one of his most
well-known works on purely scientiﬁc subjects. Stalin
presented Mars theories as having no scientiﬁc validity.
Elaborating on Marr’s problems,Stalin maintained that
Russians had developed their distinct language from the
beginning of their history. Stalin also asserted that language
did not change along with historical developmentdat least
not as drastically as Marr suggesteddand that both the
masses and the elite used the same language (I.V Stalin,
1950). Stalin also mocked Marr’s assumption that each
class had its language. At best, one could assume, Stalin
stated, that some professional groups had their distinct
argo but not a language (Stalin, 1930, p. 409). Moreover,
Stalin asserted that the language could not be described as
being similar to culture and state. It is not a “superstruc-
ture” but a phenomenon that belongs to both “base” and
“superstructure (Stalin, 2001, pp. 384–387).” Stalin also
discarded Marr’s other pet projectdthe idea of the essen-
tial intrinsic sameness of all languages, which was implic-
itly connected with the assumption that languages are
moving to an increasing fusion as time progresses. And this
foreshadowed the future rise of the one language, the way
of communication for the toilers’ futureworldwide socialist
society. Elaborating on this notion, Stalin pointed out that
some people assumed that he actually supported Marr’s
theories and quoted his statement in this regard at the 16th
Party Congress. This is a misunderstanding, he said. The
fusion of the languages in one tongue is a process of the
distant future, the time of the victory of socialism all over
the world (Stalin, 1930, pp. 415). At the same time, Stalin
implied, the emphasis should not be on discussions about
the distant future but on the study of present-day
languages in their speciﬁcity and concreteness. Moreover,
the present-day languages, indeed, emerged from different
linguistic groups and, implicitly, from different people; and
there is evidence of “proto-languages (Stalin, 2001, pp.
404).” Stalin also blasted Marr’s approach to the achieve-
ment of linguistics in the past (pp. 402). Marr, Stalin
pointed out, with an air of sarcasm, saw himself as the
greatest scholar, who should be the only fountain of ulti-
mate wisdom. Here, Stalin, of course, implicitly, placed
the criticism of Marr’s ambition in a broader ideological
context. The late Stalinism, with the emphasis on Russian
nationalism not only restored the importance of the
Russian past (this had already been done in the late
1920s–30s) but made Russia’s achievements the unsur-
passable ones in the time immemorial in all aspects of life,
including science. At the same time, Western achieve-
ments, in the past and in the present, were marginalized or
discarded. So, when Stalin attacked Marr, disregarding
the achievements of his predecessors, Stalin meant not
the Western linguists but the Russian linguists of pre-
revolutionary Russia and those who continued to work
under Soviet regimes. In conclusion, Stalin, with his char-
acteristic hypocrisy, attacked Marr (who was dead by that
time) for being absolutely intolerant of the opinion of
others; and he purged people from their jobs just because
they disagreed with his theories (pp. 403). Stalin, of course,failed to mention that in his lifetime Marr could hardly do
anything without his, Stalin’s, direct approval. The ofﬁcial
discarding of Marr’s theories had provided the opportunity
for those who disagreed with Marr to attack their fallen
idol. For some time, there was an opportunity to attack the
prevailing dogma, andMarr’s detractors were heartened by
Stalin’s statement that science could not exist without free
discussion. Still, for the vast majority engaged in the anti-
Marr drive, the support of anti-Marr views was caused by
the desire to hold a job and avoid the direct repression of
the state, which, by the end of the Stalinist era increasingly
employed the punishment prevailing in the modern West–
where those who did not ﬁt lost their jobs. And this
required not just discarding Marr’s theories as purely false
scholarly work but relating their criticism with the entire
ideological construction of the regime at that time. In
a way, those who attacked Marr were engaged in the same
activities in which Marr and his supporters had engaged in
the past, when they proclaimed that those who disagreed
with Marr had not just made scholarly mistakes but actu-
ally committed ideological/political crimes.
Stalin’s publication immediately led to the response
of the Soviet establishment. In 1951, special meetings
of representatives of the four leading humanity/social
science-focused institutionsdInstitute of Language, Insti-
tute of Archeology, Institute of Ethnography and Institute of
Historydtook place. Marr’s and related theories were dis-
carded (Predislovie, 1953). And, apparently at these meet-
ings, it was proclaimed that Marr’s theories were not only
wrong from a scholarly point of view, but also politically
inappropriate, albeit the political accusations were still
wrapped in pseudo-scholarly rhetoric.
Stalin’s proclamations, and later those of leading Soviet
scholars, that Marr’s theories were completely unaccept-
able, led to an array of publications that maintained that
Marr’s theories had no scholarly value (Tret’iakov, 1953).
This, however, was just a code word for ﬁnding in Marr’s
theories not just scholarly problems but profoundly serious
political problems. The theories were “politically incorrect,”
which required appropriate responses on all levels. Indeed,
the art of the Soviet social scientists, especially during the
Stalin era, was to distill the general, sometimes abstract,
statements of the leader and elaborate on what he just
implied. This had provided the leader, Stalin this case, the
role of detached guru, who provided just general guidance
and did not engage in too detailed an analysis that could
reveal that the leader did not know everything.
The Soviet ideologists quickly discovered that the major
reason for Stalin to reconsider his view on Marr was due to
Marr’s theory disregarding the centrality of ethnic Russians
and the Russian language and culture as the major building
block of the pre-Revolutionary Russian state and, later, the
USSR. And it is not surprising that Soviet linguists and
historians attacked these statements with gusto.
In this new interpretation of Marr’s work, he was
transformed into a scholar who disregarded and margin-
alized the role of ethnic Russians, their culture and
language, in building up the Russian state, and ﬁnding in it
too much of an inﬂuence of the culture and language of the
people who lived there before the Slavs (Levin, pp. 234).
While Marr had marginalized the role of the Russian
6 This alienation of the Russian state, especially in the Soviet period,
and the paramount role of the state is admitted by modern Western
historians. And some Western historians who, following many Russian
nationalist-minded dissidents, believed that Russians were actually
victims of the Soviet state, which in no way should be equated with
Russia/Russians. As an example of such views, see, Hosking (2006).
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attention and, as the critic implied, provided the wrong
interpretation of the role of non-Russian people on the
territory of the Russian state/USSR. And this was done not
only by Marr but also by a score of people intellectually
related to him. Marr and those who were in his intellectual
sphere made mistakes in dealing with the Jews and
Judaism. This was a glaring example of Marr and similar
people’s scholarly, and, even more, political, problems.
As was noted above, the attacks against Marr’s theories
were mostly due to the fact that they provided no room for
Russian nationalism and espoused a rather modest role for
ethnic Russians, reﬂecting the universal millenarian
universalism of the early years of the regime, which saw
itself as the spearhead of world revolution. This period was
also profoundly, anti-state, at least from the ideological
perspective. One should, of course, have no illusions in
regard to real life. The Soviet regime had implemented the
reign of terror from August/September 1918 and had been
engaged in a “discipline and punish” policydif one would
use the title of the famous Michel Foucault bookdfrom
then on. And while the state had consistently increased its
control over society, the intellectual process was lagging in
actual changes of ideological direction. For a while, the
Soviet ideologists continued to visualize worldwide revo-
lution as a spontaneous, almost anarchical, torrent, similar
to that of the Bolshevik revolution. At least this was a vision
of the revolution by some Soviet writers of the early Soviet
era, Isaac Babel, for example. The anti-statist image of the
socialists was also grounded in the emerging Soviet holy
writdLenin’s writing. In his work, State and Revolution,
Lenin regarded the Soviet state as quite different from that
bourgeois state. The socialist state was seen here as much
less controlling and repressive than the bourgeois state
plainly because the Soviet state rested on the support of the
vast majority of the peopledthe workers and peasants. It is
true that Lenin had composed his work before the
Bolshevik revolution. Still, it had never been discarded, and
it became a part of the emerging Soviet canonical writings.
This anti-statist message of Lenin’s writing was especially
strong in the early years of the Soviet regime when the
pristine myth of the revolution as the manifestation of the
people’s will was still fresh in the minds of Soviet ideolo-
gists. The future was visualized as a harmonious society in
which the state as an institution hovering over society
would actually disappear. The dream not only was over by
the late 1940s, early 1950s, but the Russian state had ree-
merged not just as a crucial aspect of Russian life but almost
as a divine force led by a semi-divine leader: Stalin. The
crucial, focal importance of the state in late Stalinismmade
it different not only from the early Soviet ideology but also
to some degree from Nazi ideology where, despite the
assertion that the “Deutschland über alles,” (Germany is
over all) the stress was not so much on the state as on the
“folk,” the Germans–Aryan folk in general. The stress on the
state in the ideology of the regime had a particular impli-
cation for Russian nationalism. Since the state soared above
all ethnic groups of the empire, it was detached from a ﬁxed
afﬁliation with any ethnic group, even from ethnic
Russians, despite their endless gloriﬁcation by ofﬁcial
ideology. Indeed, it was mostly ethnic Russians who werethe raw material from which the state had taken most of
the resources to aggrandize itself.
It was ethnic Russians–who were the majority of the
peasants and who were the majority of kolhozniki (collec-
tive farmmembers)dwho, in away, were nothing but state
bondsmen who provided the state with foodstuffs and raw
materials. It was ethnic Russians whomostly populated the
gulags and who were out-and-out state slaves. And it was
ethnic Russians who were the major source for the Red
Army engaged in defending the country and the spread of
the empire. This use of ethnic Russians as material for
building the mighty USSR was not unique; and one could
easily ﬁnd similarities between the USSR, especially in its
Stalinist version, and the Oriental despotism of the past, as
had been noted by Karl August Witfogell (1896–1988)
several generations ago in his classic work, Oriental
Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power. Indeed, it
was Chinese peasants who were the major pool for coolie
labor, which produced the Great Wall, Great Canal and
similar constructions of the ancient Chinese. All of this was
done by Oriental despotic regimes, not because the Chinese
state was hostile to the Chinese or was the Soviet/Russian
state hostile to ethnic Russiansdalbeit many enemies of
the Soviet regime proclaimed that this was, indeed, the
casedbut, plainly, because both the Han Chinese and the
Russians were the majority, an easily available resource.
The Oriental despotic state had no other interest but itself
and actually approached the majority in the same way as
the European powers of the 19th century and the Nazi state
approached othersdsubjugated colonial people, or
“untermensh” in more general terms. This absolute, divine-
like position of the state in the late Stalinist USSR/Russia
had created a sense of the anti-Russian nature of the state
and its profound detachment from ethnic Russians.6 The
notion of Sovietness is deeply connected with the divine
nature of the absolute state, transcending the narrow
deﬁnition of Russian nationalism much more than the
sense of “Aryanism” transcended the narrowly understood
sense of “Germanism.” Besides the absolute power of the
state, there were other restraints for full-blown Russian
nationalism in its racial, biological deﬁnition. European
racism was the product of capitalist modernity with its
private property and, therefore, the sacredness of law, that
application had transcended interpersonal relationships.
This was absent in Stalinist Russia/USSR, the social/
economic characteristics of which were quite similar to
those of Oriental despotism. For all these reasons, Russian
nationalism has never accepted the racial rigidity of the
Nazis. It has been, in various degrees, tempered with
“Eurasianism” of a sort. The minorities were implicitly
accepted as participants in building of the Russian state,
and even culture, in their position of “younger brothers.”
The point was to be selective. While some minorities were
indeed a “younger brother” of the family, others were
8 One might add that those Russian Jews who were not ready to
emphasize their love for Russia/Russians and who weredin addition to
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family. Jews were clearly denigrated as being pseudo
brothers and actually enemies of the Russians, Soviet
people in general, and, of course, the state, albeit, here, the
Jews are seen purely as an ethnic/racial category.
The Jews’ rolewasquitedifferent in the verybeginningof
the Soviet regime, where Jews were its most ardent
supporters. Not only were some of the leading Bolsheviks
Jewishdfrom an ethnic perspective, of coursedTrotsky,
Aleksandr Zinov’ev and Lev Kamenev could serve as exam-
ples; but the Jews had permeated all segments of the Soviet
bureaucracy, from cultural institutions to the secret police.
The changes in the state’s approach to the Jews, of course,
did not change very much the approach of the massesdthe
populacedespecially in the western part of the state, e.g.,
Ukraine, which had been anti-Semitic for centuries. The
state also started slowly to change the approach to the Jews
as timeprogressed. This couldbe traced to the late1920s and
coincidedwith the increasing role of Russian nationalism as
well as adriveagainst Trotskyandhis supporters, quite a few
of them Jewish. Still, the anti-Semitic policy of the regime
was not developed until the post-WWII period and coin-
cided with a certain debacle in the Middle East. The story
relates with the emergence of Israel. In the process of the
Israeliwarwith its Arabneighbors, theUSSRwas on the side
of Israel; and Czheckoslavakia, already under Soviet control,
had provided the Israeli army with weapons. The assump-
tion that Israel would be on the side of the USSR was not
groundless. Israeli Jews, mostly Jews from Eastern Europe,
saw the Red Army as the deliverer from the Nazis; and
socialist trends were quite strong in Israeli society. Still,
these hopes did not materialize; and Israel became
increasingly seen as a bulwark of theWest. This accelerated
the anti-Semitic drive in the Soviet elite; and Jews, under the
disguise of “rootless cosmopolitans,” became not “younger
brothers” but a type of “ﬁfth column” in the midst of the
USSR.
Marr and scores of his followers, or those who could be
afﬁliated with him directly or indirectly, had shared
a philo-Semitic inclination, quite popular in the early years
of the Soviet regime. And now these feelings and intellec-
tual afﬁliations became liabilities. This was criticized in the
context of new ideological paradigms. Those who had been
Marr supporters quite recently had recanted their views
with special vigor (Zhinkov) and implied that Marr’s
attempt to ﬁnd an important role for the Semitic languages
was an ideological blunder. It also was discovered, of
course, that Marr’s statement that the Georgian language
and the Semitic languages are quite close was absolutely
wrong. Marr’s wrong vision of the Semitic languages and
their relationship with the languages of the wholesome
minorities of the USSR/Russia was directly connected with
the discarding of the role of Jews and Judaism in the
territory of Russia/the USSR.77 The attacks against Jews and Judaism in connection with Marr’s
theory apparently enhanced the face that quite a few of Marr’s supporters
were Jews for whom the Bolshevik Revolution provided the opportunity
for social mobility. One of them was a certain V. B. Aptekar,’ who worked
in the Communists Academy. See: Golubeva (2002, pp. 68).The anti-Semitic drive of the late Stalinist era and, of
course, the later period of the Soviet regime could not be
understood out of the context of the Soviet ideology of that
period. The ofﬁcial Soviet anti-Semitism had a clear
speciﬁc. While openly anti-Semitic jokes and statements
were quite common in private conversation and since the
beginning of the post-WWII period the authorities had
engaged in a relentless drive to limit the number of
Jewsdseen, of course, here, as a purely ethnic category and
deﬁned by the famous “ﬁfth clause” (Piatyi punkt) in the
internal Soviet passportdin what authorities regarded as
sensitive jobs, the ofﬁcial propaganda had never attacked
Jews openly. From this perspective, the Soviet propaganda
was quite different from that of the Nazis; and this created
an illusion among quite a few foreign observers that anti-
Semitism was foreign to ofﬁcial Soviet discourse. When
Soviet ofﬁcial propaganda engaged in an anti- Semitic
drive, it usually did this indirectly. This was the case with
the late Stalinist era. Certain historical images and the
interpretation of the events of the past were among the
ways for Soviet authorities to convey their views and
interpretation of the Khazar Kingdom, was her a quite
important.
Khazars were Turkic people who created a strong state
in the Volga region in the earlyMiddle Ages. The peculiarity
of the Khazars was that they, at least their elite, had
professed Judiasm; and this made it possible to relate the
Khazars with Jews and their contribution to Russian
history, broadly deﬁned. This made the Khazars the target
in the late Stalinist Russia/USSR; and attacks against the
interpretation of Khazar history were, implicitly, connected
to critics of Marr and those who were close to him. While
attacks against the Khazars clearly had anti-Semitic
implications and were related to Stalin’s drive against
“rootless cosmopolitats,” (e.g., Russian Jews, in this case),
the ofﬁcial interpretation of denigrating Khazars was of
a different nature and was disguised as a scholarly or, at
least, quasi-scholarly critique. Moreover, implicitly anti-
Semitic statements could be made by Jews themselves,
which should underscore the supposed impartiality of the
statements. It was emphasized by N. Ia. Merpet, the Soviet
scholar and a Jew, judging by his family name8 that Khazars
were gloriﬁed by reactionary pre-revolutionary
historiography.
The Soviet scholars should have moved in a different
direction. They should have understood that the wrong
interpretation of Khazar history had serious political
implications; and it is not surprising that Pravda criticized
Mikhail Artamonov’s work on the Khazars (Merpet,
pp. 130). The very fact that the state’s major newspapertheir ethnicity guilty in other respects, e.g., were seen as followers/friends
of Marrdcould well be purged from their jobs during the late Stalinist
drive against “rootless” cosmopolitans. This was, for example, the case
with Ol’ga Freidenberg (1890–1955), a Jewish scholar and chair of the
Department of Classical Languages and Literature at Leningrad State
University. Not only was she Jewish but Marr was her mentor. It was not
surprising that she lost her job during the drive against “rootless
cosmopolitans.” On Freidenberg’s fate, see Nina Perlina, 1992.
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abstract subject of a bygone era indicated the clear political
sensitivity of Khazar study and shows that those who
approached the Khazars in the wrong way committed not
just scholarly but, actually, quite serious political trans-
gressions by presenting the Khazar Kingdom as a progres-
sive force (Predisolovie, 1953, pp. 6). Artamonov’s mistake
was that he emphasized too much the cultural and social-
economic development of the Khazar state. He did not
reveal the low level of Khazar culture (Merpet, pp. 166–
168.). Still, not only was the Khazar state much more
culturally inferior in comparison to the Kievan state, but it
actually had no culture at all and lived by plunder.9 Merpet
directly connected the criticism of Artamonov and other
Soviet scholars of the pro-Khazar viewwith the criticism of
Marr. The very fact that Marr had paid so much attention to
the Khazars and overestimated their role, ignoring their
predatory character, was one of the strong indications of
howwrong hewas in his theory (Merpet, pp. 170, 177–178).
It was also implied in this connection that Marr and those
who followed him in interpretations of the Khazars made
not just serious scholarly blunders but also political
mistakes. As a matter of fact, both were interrelated. The
political implications of Marr and his followers’ approach to
the Khazars was related to the fact that Pokrovsky was also
attacked for his wrong approach to the Khazars. Pokrovsky
had supported Marr’s views; and his pro-Khazar, actually
Judophilic stances, were related with a despise of Russian
history, bordering on “Russophobia,” which was quite in
vogue in the beginning of the Soviet regime. It was not just
the gloriﬁcation of the Jewish Khazars at the expense of
Russians that created serious problems; but also Marr and
related scholars’ praise of a nomadic people also became
unacceptable.
The very fact that some ethnic minorities of the
USSR/Russia were nomadic people in the past or were
still nomadic was not actually a problem for the late
Stalin’s period ideologists. Quite a few nomadic people
were fully accepted in their role of benign “younger
brothers” of the Russian/Soviet family. The others, mostly
extinct, could be plainly ignored or mentioned only in
a cursory way. Still, others should be scrutinized and
cast in the category of alien and harmful forces in a way
similar to the Jews were judged. And, here, the images
of nomads had been placed in a different ideological
context, which one could ﬁnd in the early Soviet era.
In the beginning of the Soviet regime, the image of the
nomads had been shaped by an intrinsic “Eurasianism” of
the early Soviet ideology. The ideologists in Russia/the
Soviet Union saw as being more close to the revolutionary,
or potentially revolutionary East than to the West. The
image of nomads who struck the oppressive and outdated
Roman Empire, destroying Rome and, thus, the slave
owners “mode of production,” and the slave owners’ Roman
Empire subsequent replacement by a more progressive
feudalism was supported by the Marxist vision of history.
The hordes of invading, vandalizing, barbarians were,9 Tret’iakov (1953, pp. 48); on the criticism of M. I. Artamonov’s views
on the Khazar Kingdom, see also: Kiselev, pp. 130.implicitly, related herewith images of the Russiansdin fact,
of worldwide revolutionary massesdthat through violence
and anarchic disorder brought to the world a new,
progressive, order. This image of the nomads that could be
found in the words of Russian writers and poets inside
Russia (Aleksandr Block with his Scythians) and in emigra-
tion (one could point here to Yvegeny Zamiatin’s Attila).
This image of Russians as Asiatic nomads in Russian
thought was reinforced by similar images in the West,
which had quite a long history and could be traced back at
least to 19th century French and Polish thought and even
before. In the late 19th century-early-20th century, these
images received an additional boost. Kaiser Wilhelm
developed the image of the “Yellow Peril; ” and, later,
Spengler saw the “declining West,” quite similar to the
Roman Empire, breathing its last under the invasion of
a vigorous East, with Russians similar to Mongols and
Huns. Hitler, following in Spengler’s footsteps, while
appreciating the Mongol’s ruthless brutality and drive for
worldwide conquest, which he tried to emulate, still
regarded the East as being a dangerous neighbor. While
deeply suspicious of the Japanese, despite the alliance, he
deﬁnitely saw Russians as Asiatic barbarians incarnated,
the mortal threat of the Nazi Reich, identiﬁed here with
the Roman Empire. The very fact that it was the western
enemies of the regimedthe intellectuals from the capi-
talist states of Europedwho looked at Russians as similar
to Asiatic barbarians provided the additional rationale for
the Soviet ideologists to look at these barbarians with
approving eyes. And it was not surprising that this image
of Asian nomadic people, such as the Huns, as a force that
could be equated with the revolutionary proletariat, was
quite poplar not just in Soviet literature but also in Soviet
historiography; and it was carried on until the late
Stalinist era. This was the case, for example, with A. N.
Bershtam, the author of a book on the Huns. Marr was also
implicitly connected with this gloriﬁcation of the Nomadic
people, for Marr saw them as a legitimate part of the
Japhetic family and representative of the downtrodden
masses, who fought against the oppressive order. Their
destructive waves on agricultural/sedentary societies and
their states were regarded in this context as a manifesta-
tion of revolutionary exuberance and, implicitly, quite
progressive.
By the late Stalinism, Marr’s ideological emphasis was
quite different from that of the early Soviet period. Anar-
chical violence and vandalismunder any pretextwere out of
fashion; and the state, as was noted before, had reemerged
as an essential part of discourse. It was praise not of anar-
chical exuberance of the revolutionary masses but of order
andpower. Indeed, even revolutionaryworkers and soldiers
and sailors who emerged in the visual presentation of the
Bolshevik Revolution were an orderly force that strictly
followed the orders of the party and its leaderdLenin. The
turnaround, when the praise of anarchical disorder was
replaced with the gloriﬁcation of a strong state, certainly
was not a unique Russian/Soviet phenomenon. The same
could be seen in Mao’s China when, upon the end of the
Cultural Revolution, Mao immediately started to praise the
First Emperor of Qin who, along with many other deeds,
imposed strict order in the state.
12 On the explanation of Marr’s theory in the context of postmodernism,
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Soviet ideologist changed their views of the many nomadic
people. While before, in the early periods of Russian
history, they were praised, now they were actually viewed
as a reactionary force. Therefore, they were seen now as the
mortal enemies of the Kievan state. Moreover, even those
nomadic people who were not directly responsible for
attacking Russians in any period of its history still were
blacklisted. The Huns, for example, could easily be related
with the Pechenegs, the Polovtsy and the Mongols, the
enemies of the Kievan state, at least in this interpretation.
They could also be related with the Nazis; and, indeed, in
the minds of most Russiansdand not just ideologists of the
regimedthe recent war with Germany was in a certain
natural way connected with the calamities of the past in
which nomadic Asians, such as theMongols, had played the
leading role. It is not surprising that the views of those
historians (such as Bershtam) who found a positive aspect
in the Huns’ invasionwere rejected. At the same time, their
defeat by coalition forces of a sort (which included Romans)
were implicitly praised.10 Bershtam was deﬁnitely not
alone in facing the problems with the state. This was also
the fate of those historians who were accused of ﬁnding
positive aspects in the Mongol conquerors of Russia
(Krupnov; Tret’iakov, 1953, pp. 48) or of the Turkic people
in general, who were also seen as basically primitive
nomads (Chikobava, 1951–1952b). These attacks on Turkic
people could well be explained if onewould remember that
since the beginning of the Cold War, Turkey, had become
a member of NATO; and Turkey, with which the USSR had
a lot of problems, was deﬁnitely on Stalin’s black list. This
provided a reason for Soviet ideologists to look at the Turkic
peoples’ contribution to world civilization with skepticism.
The very fact that Marr believed the Turkish language as
having been possibly one of the most ancient of langua-
gesdand that Turkey’s long linguistic pedigree provided
the Turkish language and culture with certain cultural/
political respectabilitydprovided the authorities with an
additional reason to blast Marr.11 This criticism of Marr and
those who could be seen as loosely afﬁliated with his
ideological allies struck on several fronts. All of them were
connected by the undercurrent of an ideadthe importance
of the Russian state and ethnic Russians as the major
builders of the state. This required not just upholding the
notion about the uniqueness of the Russian language
tightly connected with ethnic Russians, and the praise of
ethnic Russians, but also required downplaying the role of
ethnic minorities, even those who were indigenous people
of Russia/the USSR. One should add that Soviet ideologists
weren’t consistent in their criticism of Marr and his ideo-
logical position in general. While for most Russian critics,
Marr’s major problems were implicitly his discard of the
importance of the Russian language and of Russians as an
ethnic group, for othersMarr’s problems were of a different
nature. For example, he did not pay much attention to the
study of the languages of those people of the USSR who10 Tret’iakov, 1953, pp. 44; On the criticism of A. N. Bershtam’s work, The
Notes on History of the Huns, (Ocherki po istorii gunov), see also Kiselev.
11 On Marr’s approach to the Turkic language, see Tetik, 2002.belong to the Turkic and Ugro-Finnic linguistic groups
(Sebriakova).
7. Conclusion
One could see from this study that what seems to be the
abstract linguistic construction of Marrismde.g., the
notion of the essential sameness in the matrix of practically
all languages and their easy transformation to each other,
was clearly connected with the early dreams of the Soviet
regime about the coming worldwide revolution and the
unity of the global proletariat, toilers in the broad meaning
of the word. As no revolutionary wave was in sight by the
1920s, the authorities started to insist not on the unity of
the global proletariat but on the unity of the people of the
USSR. Still, the early ideological trends had their own
momentum; and, because there was no direct call from the
above, many Soviet linguists continued to develop an early
form of universalistic Marrism. Still, after WWII, when
Russian nationalism became the most essential component
in the ofﬁcial “National-Bolshevism” of the regime, where
universalistic Marxism was just a ﬁg leaf, the direct
message was sent by no one but Stalin. At that point, the
grave mistakes of Marrism and related phenomenon were
revealed. This direct connection of the evolution of Marr-
ism in the USSR with the general political arrangements of
the regime possibly explains the approach to Marrism in
the West.
It seems that Marrism should have fascinated genera-
tions of Western post-modernists, especially linguists. This
would have been the case not just due to the importance of
Marr in Soviet linguistics, but also to the general operational
framework of post-modernists linguists;12 and itwould also
have been due to the popularity of Russian/Soviet linguists
when Russia/the USSR was a focal point of discussion in
academia. Indeed, Roman Jakobson and Prince Trubetskoy,
with their Eurasian and post-modernist slants, are seen as
two founders of modern linguistics. Still, Marr has been
almost forgotten; and little has been published about him,
both in the USSR13 and in the West.14
One of the possible explanations is that Marrism
showed how strongly abstract theories seem to be shaped
by societal restraints, often by direct application of power
in this or that form, and punishment, either through
paycheck or direct repression. Marr’s case also shows how
brazenly these restraints are used to shape intellectual
activities. One should be fair here. Societal restraints and
the punishment of troublemakers could be found in the
“West” where checks and jobsdor, to be precise, not
providing checks and jobsdis onemajor way of inﬂuencing
intellectual trends in an acceptable direction. Still, only in
the totalitarian regime, which does not just deprive those
who dissent from livelihooddand it does this with muchsee, Reznik, 2007.
13 The ﬁrst article fully elaborated on Marr seems to have been pub-
lished only in 1997, more than 60 years after his death. See “Marr et
Marrisme, 1997”.
14 On the few publications on Marr in English in the last 40–50 years,
see Slezkine (1996).
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eliminates them in the jaws of the gulags, the societal/state
control over intellectual activities has reached absolute
perfectedness. Moreover, open application of force and the
role of raw power in the production of intellectual output
not only reveals the essential essence of the totalitarian
regime but also implicitly the role of force in others, e.g.
Western societies. This application of power as shaping the
direction of intellectual inquiry is pretty much understood
by Soviet and late-post Soviet scholars, including those
who touch upon the fate of Marr.15 Still, this intellectual
construct could hardly please the majority of Western
intellectuals. They might agree that an intellectual trend
could be the result of social/economic dynamics. Some of
them might accept this notion, but add that not only are
theseMarxist explanations outdated but also simplistic and
intellectually non-engaging. At the same time, they would
deﬁnitely recoil from the notion that all discursive
sophistication is often just a response to the needs of the
authorities, especially in totalitarian regimes or strongly
inﬂuenced by the desire to see their works in print in
respectable journals or even plainly related with quest for
a good job. They ﬁrmly believe that it is not that discourse
follows the crack-up of power but it is power that so much
depends on discourse. And since Marr and his followers’
saga demonstrates that this was not the case, it provides
a good excuse to forget quickly about their existence.
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